











conspiracy	 to	possess	with	 intent	 to	distribute	cocaine,	 conspiracy	 to	
commit	 money	 laundering,	 and	 attempted	 possession	 with	 intent	 to	
distribute.2	 	Having	been	charged	in	1993,	Johnson	was	subject	to	the	
mandatory	 sentencing	 guidelines	 established	 by	 the	 United	 States	




In	 2020,	 President	 Donald	 Trump	 pardoned	 Johnson	 after	 she	
spoke	 at	 the	 Republican	 National	 Convention.5	 	 Johnson,	 whose	




















worker	 and	 an	 ordained	 minister.8	 	 She	 even	 helped	 coordinate	 the	
prison	Special	Olympics.9		In	light	of	all	this,	it	is	hardly	surprising	that	
Johnson	received	one	of	 the	highest,	albeit	one	of	 the	rarest,	 forms	of	
clemency.10	
While	 Johnson	walked	 free	 under	 the	 auspices	 of	 a	 presidential	
pardon,	her	co-conspirator,	Curtis	McDonald,	sought	relief	in	the	courts	
in	 another	way—in	 the	 form	 of	 compassionate	 release.11	 	McDonald,	
much	 like	 his	 co-conspirator,	 was	 also	 considered	 an	 “exemplary	






McDonald	 would	 have	 had	 little	 ability	 to	 seek	 relief.	 	 But	 in	 2018,	
Congress	passed	the	First	Step	Act	(FSA),16	one	of	the	most	significant	
criminal	 justice	 reform	 bills	 in	 recent	 memory.17	 	 Among	 its	 more	
extensive	provisions,	the	FSA	called	for	the	implementation	of	a	risk	and	
needs	 assessment	 system	 and	 the	 retroactive	 application	 of	 the	 Fair	
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such	 release	 should	 the	 inmate	 demonstrate	 extraordinary	 and	
compelling	reasons	for	doing	so.21	
Although	 there	are	 thousands	of	 inmates	 like	Alice	 Johnson	who	
were	sentenced	under	the	now-defunct	mandatory	guidelines	regime,22	
a	severe	minority	will	receive	a	personal	pardon	from	the	president,	as	
evidenced	 by	McDonald’s	 case.	 	 Yet,	 the	 expansion	 of	 compassionate	
release	under	the	FSA	may	seem	like	a	natural	means	of	granting	more	
pardons,	of	correcting	a	time	where	judges	were	forced	to	impose	what	




establish	 extraordinary	 and	 compelling	 grounds	 for	 their	 complete	
release.24	
This	is	the	question	before	the	courts	today,	and	the	answers	from	
the	district	 courts	 are	 far	 from	uniform.	 	And	while	 every	 judge	may	
hope	to	have	a	petition	from	an	inmate	as	exemplary	as	Alice	Johnson,	
each	inmate	will	present	nuanced	factual	contexts	in	which	to	consider	
the	 phrase	 “extraordinary	 and	 compelling.”	 	 Factors	 such	 as	 old	 age,	
illness,	 or	 family	 obligations	 may	 lend	 themselves	 naturally	 to	 the	






alone	 be	 a	 factor	 in	 the	 compassionate	 release	 inquiry	 that	 carries	
weight?	 	 From	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	 United	 States	 Sentencing	
Commission	in	1987	to	the	Supreme	Court’s	decision	in	United	States	v.	
Booker	 in	2005	 rendering	 them	advisory,	 thousands	of	 inmates	were	















if	 any,	 should	 this	 change	 in	 the	 sentencing	 regime	brought	about	by	
Booker	carry	when	considering	an	inmate’s	petition	for	compassionate	
release?	





brief	 overview	 of	 both	 the	 sentencing	 guidelines	 and	 compassionate	




“extraordinary	 and	 compelling	 reasons.”	 	 Part	 IV	 synthesizes	 these	












the	 years	 leading	 up	 to	 the	 creation	 of	 the	 Sentencing	 Commission,	
federal	judges	had	largely	unlimited	discretion	in	imposing	a	sentence.29		
The	 sheer	 amount	of	 discretion	 led	 some	 to	 condemn	 the	 sentencing	
system	 and	 its	 resulting	 disparities.30	 	 Over	 the	 years,	 demands	 for	
judicial	 accountability	and	uniformity	 in	 sentencing	gained	 traction.31		
Due	in	part	to	the	generally	perceived	need	for	uniformity	in	sentencing,	
as	well	as	 the	 “tough	on	crime”	politics	of	 the	day,	 in	1984,	Congress	
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the	 Sentencing	 Reform	 Act,	 created	 the	 United	 States	 Sentencing	
Commission	(the	“Sentencing	Commission”),	an	independent	agency	of	
the	 judicial	branch	 tasked	with	creating	sentencing	guidelines	 for	 the	
federal	courts.33	
The	Sentencing	Commission’s	guidelines	created	a	comprehensive	
set	 of	 rules	 which	 directed	 courts	 to	 impose	 certain	 minimum	 and	
maximum	 sentences	 based	 on	 the	 severity	 of	 the	 crime	 and	 the	
defendant’s	 criminal	 history.34	 	 From	 1987	 until	 2005,	 these	
“guidelines”	 were,	 in	 fact,	 mandatory.35	 	 Judges	 were	 required	 to	
sentence	defendants	based	on	a	two-axis	chart,	considering	the	severity	
of	the	crime	and	criminal	history.		A	dizzying	array	of	aggravating	and	




time	 lamented	 the	 changes	brought	 about	 by	 the	new	 regime.	 	 Some	
judges	 complained	 of	 their	 inability	 to	 adjust	 sentencing	 based	 on	
several	 issues	not	accounted	 for	 in	 the	guidelines,	 essentially	 turning	
them	 into	 “robots”	 that	 could	 not	 account	 for	 the	 “human	 factor”	
inherent	 in	 sentencing.38	 	 The	 guidelines,	 for	 example,	 discouraged	
departures	based	on	family	matters,	employment,	and	good	works.39		In	
many	cases,	judges	openly	indicated	their	begrudging	adherence	to	the	
mandatory	guidelines	 regime	overall.40	 	Beyond	 the	 judiciary,	 several	
scholars	 criticized	 the	harsh	outcomes	of	 the	 Sentencing	Reform	Act,	
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also	 pointed	 to	 its	 social	 costs	 as	 evidenced	 by	 the	 rising	 prison	
population.42	 	 Supporters	 responded	 that	 such	a	model	 of	 sentencing	
















completely	 emasculate	 the	 guidelines.	 	 Judges	 were	 still	 required	 to	
consult	the	guidelines	and,	in	making	a	downward	or	upward	departure	
from	the	range,	were	prompted	to	consult	the	§	3553(a)	factors	set	out	
in	 the	 statute,	 which	 delineate	 a	 number	 of	 sentencing	 goals.48		
Moreover,	Booker	did	not	make	its	changes	retroactive.49	
The	 lack	of	 retroactivity	prompts	 a	 fundamental	 question:	what,	
then,	of	those	inmates	sentenced	between	1984	and	2006?		Few	tools	
exist	to	provide	this	class	of	inmates	with	a	second	look.		Perhaps	their	




















system,	 abolished	by	 the	 same	act	 that	brought	 about	 the	 sentencing	
guidelines,	used	to	provide	a	second	look	that	would	allow	the	prison	
system	 to	 	 release	 and	 monitor	 eligible	 inmates	 subject	 to	 certain	
conditions.50		The	Parole	Commission—the	organization	responsible	for	
overseeing	 parole—was	 empowered	 to	 release	 inmates	 under	 the	
supervision	of	a	parole	officer,	with	conditions	in	place	to	protect	public	
safety.51		During	the	course	of	its	life,	the	Parole	Commission	would	issue	
anywhere	 between	 10,000	 and	 20,000	 decisions	 each	 year.52	 	 The	
Commission	 also	 provided	 inmates	 the	 opportunity	 to	 appeal	 its	
decision	as	of	right.53		Since	its	abolition,	the	number	of	annual	decisions	
has	plummeted.54	 	The	dearth	of	recent	decisions	is	largely	due	to	the	
fact	 that	 the	 Comprehensive	 Crime	 Control	 Act—the	 same	 act	which	
brought	about	the	Sentencing	Commission—limited	parole	requests	to	
those	 sentenced	before	November	1,	 1987.55	 	 Thus,	 inmates	between	
2006	 and	 2018	 had	 few	 avenues	 for	 relief	 from	 the	 now-defunct	
guidelines	sentenced	them	under.	
C.		New	Forms	of	Relief	in	the	First	Step	Act	
With	 the	 passage	 of	 the	 FSA	 in	 2018,	 Congress	 introduced	 a	
number	 of	 provisions	 with	 the	 potential	 to	 incentivize	 and	 promote	
reductions	 in	 sentencing	 based	 on	 inmate	 behavior.	 	 Among	 other	
things,	the	FSA	directed	the	Bureau	of	Prisons	to	incentivize	inmates	to	
participate	in	recidivism	reduction	programs	through	the	use	of	“earned	
time	 credits,”	 which	 allow	 a	 prisoner	 to	 reduce	 his	 or	 her	 sentence	
should	 they	choose	 to	participate	 in	 certain	programs	or	 should	 they	
engage	 in	 good	 behavior.56	 	 Yet,	 seventy	 separate	 crimes	 are	 exempt	
from	 the	FSA’s	 incentives.57	 	 Thus,	many	 inmates	 sentenced	between	
1987	and	2006	remain	ineligible	for	such	rewards.		Additionally,	the	FSA	
prompted	the	review	and	enhancement	of	a	“risk	and	needs	assessment	





















provisions.	 	 Prior	 to	 the	 FSA,	 an	 inmate	 could	 obtain	 compassionate	
release	only	upon	a	motion	of	the	Bureau	of	Prisons,	thereafter	proving	
extraordinary	 and	 compelling	 reasons	 for	 granting	 such	 a	 request,	
which	included	medical	reasons,	age,	family	circumstances,	and	the	all-
ambiguous	“other	reasons.”60		In	the	prior	regime,	the	Bureau	of	Prisons	
rarely	 granted	 these	 requests.61	 	 Under	 the	 new	 regime,	 inmates	 can	
petition	the	courts	directly	for	compassionate	release	after	exhausting	
all	 other	 administrative	 remedies.62	 	 The	 policy	 statement	
accompanying	 the	 compassionate	 release	 provision	 did	 not	 provide	
greater	 detail	 as	 to	 what	 exactly	 constitutes	 “other	 reasons”	 for	
release.63	 	 Thus,	 at	 present,	 courts	 possess	 wide	 latitude	 in	
interpretation.64			
Overall,	 courts	 are	 now	 charged	 with	 orchestrating	 the	
compassionate	release	inquiry.	 	 In	this	inquiry,	courts	are	first	tasked	
with	determining	whether	extraordinary	and	compelling	reasons	exist	
for	 release	 and,	moreover,	whether	 release	 comports	with	 the	 broad	
sentencing	goals	set	out	in	18	U.S.C.	§	3553(a).65		Upon	finding	an	inmate	
eligible	 for	 compassionate	 release,	 a	 court	 may	 either	 eliminate	 or	
modify	the	sentence	as	well	as	impose	safeguards,	such	as	supervised	
release.66		In	short,	the	compassionate	release	question,	without	much	
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nor	 the	 Sentencing	 Commission	 has	 provided	 any	more	 guidance	 on	
what	constitutes	an	extraordinary	and	compelling	reason	for	release.68		
Although	 some	 courts	 have	 divined	 a	 narrow	 congressional	 intent	
through	legislative	history,69	many	have	ultimately	found	that	the	term	
itself	 is	 broad	 and	open	 for	 judicial	 interpretation.70	 	 The	only	policy	
statement	suggesting	a	more	concrete	definition	of	“extraordinary	and	
compelling”	 is,	 as	 many	 courts	 have	 found,	 defunct.71	 	 The	 vestigial	
statement	appears	to	conflict	with	the	FSA	insofar	as	it	still	grants	the	
Director	of	the	Bureau	of	Prisons	exclusive	authority	to	petition	courts	
for	 review,	whereas	 the	 FSA	 clearly	 allows	 inmates	 to	 petiton	 courts	
directly.72		The	Sentencing	Commission	has	been	unable	to	promulgate	
additional	guidelines	due	to	the	lack	of	a	quorum.73		Thus,	judges	have	






























§	 3553(a)	 factors—factors	 that	 delineate	 broad	 goals	 identified	 by	
Congress	to	be	achieved	by	sentencing.75		Such	factors	take	into	account	
some	of	the	broader	theoretical	goals	of	sentencing	such	as	deterrence.76		
Thus,	 extraordinary	 and	 compelling	 reasons	 for	 release	 will	 not	
suffice—those	reasons	must	comport	with	several	of	these	broad	goals	
for	 an	 inmate	 to	 succeed	 on	 a	 compassionate	 release	 claim.77	 	 The	










included,	 through	 its	 own	 “independent	 assessment”	 of	 the	
extraordinary	and	compelling	term,	an	analysis	of	whether	the	change	
from	 a	 mandatory	 to	 advisory	 regime	 carried	 weight	 in	 the	
compassionate	 release	 analysis.78	 	 There,	 the	 underlying	 defendant,	
Richard	Wayne	Parker,	was	sentenced	to	life	in	prison	and	five	years	of	
supervised	release	for	cocaine-related	charges.79		The	court	found	that	
the	 change	 in	 sentencing,	 especially	 in	 light	 of	 the	 defendant’s	 co-
conspirator	 having	 successfully	 reduced	 his	 sentence	 after	 Booker,	
constituted	 an	 extraordinary	 and	 compelling	 reason	 for	 release,	
alongside	health	complications	amidst	COVID-19.80		Having	satisfied	the	


















determination	 that	 a	 change	 in	 the	 guidelines	 might	 constitute	 an	
extraordinary	 and	 compelling	 reason	 for	 release,	 other	 courts	 have	
provided	a	richer	analysis	of	the	issue.		In	United	States	v.	Quinn,	the	U.S.	
District	Court	for	the	Northern	District	of	California	similarly	found	that	
a	 change	 in	 sentencing	 constituted	 an	 extraordinary	 and	 compelling	
reason	for	release	based	on	its	views	about	the	harshness	of	the	prior	
sentencing	 regime.82	 	 In	 finding	 that	 extraordinary	 and	 compelling	
reasons	existed	to	justify	release,	the	court	began	its	reasoning	by	noting	
that	 the	 defendant	 was	 “sentenced	 under	 a	 far	 more	 draconian	
sentencing	 regime	 than	 exists	 today.”83	 	 The	 underlying	 defendant,	
designated	 as	 a	 “career	 offender,”	 was	 sentenced	 to	 562	 months	 in	
prison,	followed	by	a	five-year	supervised	release	for	committing	two	
armed	bank	 robberies	 in	 the	Bay	Area	of	 San	Francisco.84	 	 The	 court	
noted	that	the	defendant	“likely	would	have	been	released	12	[sic]	years	
ago	 .	.	.	 if	 sentenced	 under	 today’s	 regime.”85	 	 This	was	 so,	 the	 court	
reasoned,	 provided	 that	 “[the	 defendant]	 still	 would	 have	 received	 a	
sentence	at	 the	 low	end	of	 the	guidelines	range,	as	he	did	 in	1992.”86		
With	 respect	 to	 the	 argument	 that	 it	 is	 not	 the	 court’s	 job	 to	 decide	
whether	certain	updates	in	sentencing	are	retroactive,	the	court	noted	
that	 while	 Congress	 did	 not	 make	 such	 changes	 categorically	
retroactive,	 it	 still	 may	 have	 contemplated	 case-by-case	 judicial	
exemptions.87	 	 The	 court	 imported	 some	 of	 this	 reasoning	 into	 the	 §	
3553(a)	 inquiry,	noting	both	 that	 supervised	 release	mitigated	 safety	
concerns	and	that	the	defendant’s	sentence	was	sufficient	under	today’s	
standards.88	
Similarly,	 the	 Northern	 District	 of	 California	 found	 in	 favor	 of	 a	
defendant	on	comparable	grounds	in	United	States	v.	Jones,	noting	both	
the	harshness	of	the	prior	regime	and	that	the	likelihood	of	a	downward	
departure	 was	 the	 guidelines	 advisory.89	 	 There,	 the	 court	 found	
extraordinary	 and	 compelling	 reasons	 for	 release	 for	 a	 defendant	
sentenced	 to	 over	 240	months	 for	 counts	 relating	 to	 bank	 robbery.90		
The	 court	 reasoned	 that	 “[the	 sentencing	 judge]	 accepted	 the	














indicated	 that	 “a	 downward	 departure	 may	 well	 have	 been	
appropriate.”91	 	 It	 also	 noted,	 however,	 that	 “Booker	 did	 not	
automatically	 provide	 relief	 to	 defendants	 like	 Mr.	 Jones	 who	 were	
sentenced	before	the	decision	issued.”92		Despite	this,	the	court	indeed	
found	 that	 the	 change	 in	 guidelines,	 and	 the	 likely	 lower	 sentence,	
constituted	extraordinary	and	compelling	reasons	for	release.93	
Other	 courts	 have	 found	 that	 a	 change	 in	 the	 sentencing	 regime	
constitutes	 an	 extraordinary	 and	 compelling	 reason	 for	 release	 even	
where	there	was	no	indication	that	the	sentencing	judge	erred	on	the	




related	 crimes	 despite	 an	 available	 guidelines	 range	 of	 292	 to	 365	
months	 coupled	 with	 a	 mandatory	 minimum	 of	 twenty	 years	 for	 a	





remedy	 harsh	 sentences.97	 	 Given	 the	 defendant’s	 “unusually	 long	
sentence”	 as	 evidenced	 by	modern	 average	 sentences	 for	marijuana-








difficult	 to	 accord	 the	 sentencing	 judge	 due	 deference	 and	 to	 predict	












example,	 the	U.S.	District	Court	 for	 the	Western	District	of	Tennessee	
denied	 compassionate	 release	 to	 Curtis	 McDonald,	 Alice	 Marie	
Johnson’s	 co-conspirator,	 in	 part	 because	 of	 a	 lack	 of	 trial	 record	
evidence	 of	 the	 trial	 judge’s	 likelihood	 of	 guidelines	 departure.99	 	 In	
United	States	v.	McDonald,	the	court	refused	to	incorporate	a	change	in	
sentencing	 in	 the	 compassionate	 release	 inquiry.100	 	 The	 court	 found	
that	 although	 a	 change	 in	 the	 sentencing	 regime	 may	 constitute	
extraordinary	and	compelling	reasons	for	release,	it	could	not	say	with	
finality	 that	 McDonald’s	 sentence	 was	 the	 result	 of	 the	 mandatory	
sentencing	 framework.101	 	 This	 was	 so,	 the	 court	 reasoned,	 because	
there	was	no	evidence	that	the	sentencing	judge	viewed	the	mandatory	
life	sentence	as	“unfair	and	utterly	disproportionate	to	the	crimes.”102		It	
noted	 that	 other	 courts	 could	 do	 so	 given	 the	 clear	 trial	 record	
evidencing	the	sentencing	judge’s	displeasure	with	the	regime.103	
Courts	on	this	side	of	the	argument	have	also	noted	separation	of	
powers	concerns.	 	Elaborating	on	the	reasoning	 in	McDonald,	 the	U.S.	
District	Court	 for	 the	Eastern	District	of	Pennsylvania	similarly	 found	
that	a	 change	 in	sentencing	does	not	constitute	an	extraordinary	and	
compelling	 reason	 for	 release	 due	 to	 deference	 and	 separation	 of	
powers	 issues.104	 	 In	 United	 States	 v.	 Andrews,	 the	 court	 found	 the	




his	 age,	 rehabilitation,	 susceptibility	 to	 COVID-19,	 the	 length	 of	 his	
sentence,	the	change	in	the	sentencing	regime,	and	the	amendment	to	§	
924(c).106		The	court	found	that	while	the	defendant’s	first	three	reasons	




















sentencing	 to	hold	weight	 so	 long	as	other	circumstances	accompany	
it.109		Moreover,	the	court	noted	that	considering	sentence	length	would	
conflict	with	the	“rule	of	finality”	in	sentencing.110	




being	 convicted	 for	 several	 cocaine-related	 charges.112	 The	defendant	
argued	 that	 there	were	extraordinary	and	 compelling	 reasons	 for	his	
release	 “because	 if	 sentenced	 today,	 he	would	 receive	 a	 substantially	
lower	sentence	than	what	the	mandatory	guidelines	called	for.”113		The	
court	found	that	such	reasons	were	not	extraordinary	and	compelling	























	 117	 Id.	 (“The	 undercutting	 of	Booker’s	core	 remedial	 measure	 has	 created	 a	lost	
generation	.	.	.	where	individual	citizens	pay	penance	for	the	constitutional	errors	of	the	
sovereign.	For	twenty	years	of	this	nation’s	history	.	.	.	harsh	sentences	.	.	.	were	imposed	













now,	 is	a	cumbersome	tool	 for	remedying	pre-Booker	 sentences.	 	The	
difficulties	 are	 roughly	 divisible	 into	 two	 categories:	 practicality	 and	
fairness.	 	 In	 the	way	of	 practical	 application	of	 the	 guidelines,	 courts	
encounter	 three	 main	 difficulties:	 (i)	 divining	 whether	 the	 original	
sentence	truly	is	egregious	and	thus	“extraordinary,”	(ii)	encroaching	on	
the	power	of	the	sentencing	judge	and	acting	as	de	facto	appellate	courts	






















Cal.	 2020)	 (granting	 compassionate	 release	 where	 defendant	 was	 given	 the	 lowest	
available	sentence	of	562	months	under	the	then-mandatory	guidelines).	
	 120	 See	 Jones,	 482	F.	 Supp.	 3d	 at	 973,	 979	 (finding	both	 that	 the	 sentencing	 judge	










sentencing	 judge	 available	 for	 review.122	 	 In	 several	 cases,	 the	
underlying	 sentencing	 judges	 clarified	 their	 disagreement	 with	 the	
mandatory	sentencing	regime	and	the	outcome	forced	by	the	sentencing	
guidelines.123	 	When	 this	 blatant	 frustration	 coincides	with	 a	 current	
judge’s	view	that	changes	in	public	sentiment	on	the	severity	of	certain	
crimes	 (i.e.,	 marijuana-related	 offenses)	 warrant	 reduction,	 there	 is	
little	conflict.		In	such	cases,	judges	on	review	for	compassionate	release	
will	have	little	trouble	finding	that	the	sentence	is	wholly	unnecessary.	
In	 more	 difficult	 cases,	 it	 is	 not	 clear	 whether	 the	 guidelines	
hindered	the	judge’s	discretion.124		In	such	cases,	it	is	not	so	black	and	
white.	 	Courts	have	been	and	will	 continue	 to	be	put	 in	 the	awkward	
position	of	speculating	on	whether	the	sentencing	judge	was	justified,	
why	 they	 strayed	 from	 the	 mandatory	 minimum,	 and	 whether	 the	
inmate,	 accounting	 for	 modern	 thought	 on	 just	 and	 proportional	
sentences,	would	still	have	been	given	the	same	sentence.125		Simply	put,	
if	the	judge	exercised	at	least	some	discretion—that	is,	did	not	opt	for	
the	 minimum	 sentence—or	 was	 forced	 to	 institute	 the	 mandatory	




Second,	 issues	 of	 encroachment	 on	 the	 traditional	 role	 of	 the	
sentencing	judge	are	at	play.		Indeed,	some	judges	have	been	willing	to	























law.	 	 The	 judicial	 system	 contemplates	 that	 trial	 judges	 are,	 in	most	
cases,	 the	 ultimate	 arbiters	 of	 fact	 and,	 thus,	 in	 the	 best	 position	 to	
determine	 sentencing	 given	 their	 proximity	 to	 the	 parties	 and	 the	
evidence.128	 	Federal	courts	have	stated	that	maxim	verbatim.129	 	Such	
principles	are	reflected	in	the	appellate	review	of	a	sentence,	where	an	
appellate	 court	 “will	 only	overturn	a	sentence	that	 is	 ‘arbitrary,	
capricious,	whimsical,	or	manifestly	unreasonable.’”130	
Fixing	 compassionate	 release	 upon	 an	 inquiry	 of	 whether	 the	
sentence	 is	unfair	given	a	change	 in	 the	sentencing	regime	can	easily	
frustrate	the	power	and	deference	given	to	sentencing	judges.		For	one,	
the	question	of	whether	the	sentence	is	patently	unfair	given	a	change	
in	 sentencing	 would	 allow	 courts	 to	 overturn	 the	 sentence	 simply	
because	they	presently	find	it	unfair	or	aberrational,131	thus	stepping	on	
the	 sentencing	 judge’s	 toes	 merely	 because	 they	 disagree	 with	 the	
outcome.		Relatedly,	such	a	loose	standard	is	not	nearly	as	high	a	bar	as	
“arbitrary	 and	 capricious”;	 trial	 courts,	 then,	 would	 be	 afforded	
immense	 power	 that	 even	 appellate	 courts	 on	 review	 do	 not	 have.		
These	problems	are	evident	in	cases	where	judges	seem	to	be	willing	to	
disregard	the	sentence	even	where	it	is	unclear	whether	the	sentencing	


























into	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 compassionate	 release	 inquiry	 essentially	makes	






Congress	 did	 not	 alter	 that	 default	 presumption.135	 	 Allowing	 the	
judiciary	 to	 essentially	 resentence	 all	 those	 sentenced	 under	 a	
mandatory	 scheme	 because	 of	 Booker	 thus	 implicates	 separation	 of	
powers	concerns.136	 	 If	a	change	 in	 the	sentencing	regime	 itself	holds	
weight,	courts	risk	opening	the	door	to	compassionate	release	to	nearly	
every	 inmate	 sentenced	 before	 Booker	 rendered	 the	 guidelines	
advisory.	 	 Some	 courts	 have	 countered,	 however,	 that	 Congress	 did	
indeed	 contemplate	 retroactivity	 insofar	 as	 the	 mechanism	 is	
fundamentally	 a	 quasi-parole	 system	 that	 should	 allow	 review	 of	 all	
viable	cases.137	
One	 other,	 though	 perhaps	 less	 serious	 concern,	 is	 the	 prospect	
that	granting	release	based	merely	on	a	change	in	sentencing	does	not	
account	for	a	risk	of	recidivism.		As	previously	mentioned,	judges	must	




a	 change	 in	 sentencing,	 this	 occurred	 in	 light	 of	 a	 §	 3553(a)	 analysis	
evidencing	 extremely	 low	 risks	 of	 recidivism,	 whether	 through	 the	
inmate’s	 personal	 growth	 or	 the	 reassurances	 of	 family.140	 	 Perhaps	
most	 importantly,	 many	 of	 the	 sentences	 in	 the	 above	 cases	 came	





















relief.	 	 Although	 a	 judge	 may,	 under	 the	 compassionate	 release	
provisions,	impose	supervised	release	or	merely	adjust	the	sentence,142	
sentencing	 judges	 may	 still	 be	 discernibly	 anxious	 about	 second	








on	 the	 simple	 fact	 that	 they	 are	pre-Booker	 inmates,	 they	often	must	
prove	other	extraordinary	and	compelling	reasons	for	release,	such	as	
exemplary	behavior,	and	must	also	satisfy	the	§	3553(a)	factors.		Yet,	if	
the	 judicial	 consensus	 is	 that	 many	 thousands	 of	 inmates	 were	
sentenced	 unfairly	 under	 a	 dark	 and	 “draconian”	mandatory	 regime,	









development	 of	 a	 recidivism	 reduction	 system	 with	 credits	 in	 its	
framework.145	 	 Unfortunately,	 pre-FSA,	 there	 were	 few	 incentives	 to	
engage	 in	 good	 behavior.	 	 First,	 as	 noted	 above,	 the	 federal	 parole	






Burton,	 427	 N.E.2d	 625,	 628	 (Ill.	 App.	 Ct.	 1981))	 (“[F]elons	 [sentenced	 to	 the	
penitentiary]	are	in	greater	need	of	rehabilitation	and	need	a	greater	incentive	.	.	.	to	get	







thousands	 of	 decisions	 a	 year.147	 	 Pre-FSA	 compassionate	 release	
petitions,	moreover,	were	routinely	denied	by	the	Bureau	of	Prisons.148		
Courts	 have	 routinely	 noted	 that	 motions	 for	 compassionate	 release	
were	 rarely	 even	 filed	 by	 the	 bureau.149	 	 Thus,	 prisoners	 sentenced	
before	2006	had	little	hope	for	relief	even	in	the	face	of	their	good	work	
or	personal	growth.	




traits	 that	 would	 grant	 release.	 	 Only	 those	 who,	 by	 their	 own	
circumstances,	 managed	 to	 demonstrate	 a	 clean	 record	 would	 be	
eligible	 for	 this	 extraordinary	 remedy.	 	 And	 because	 it	 is	 an	
extraordinary	remedy,	many	will	not	be	able	to	attain	it.		Compassionate	
release	thus	attempts	 to	sort	among	angels	and	demons.	 	There	 is	no	
comparable	 relief	 for	 those	 who	 may	 be	 substantially	 capable	 of	

































One	 pending	 piece	 of	 legislation	 sponsored	 by	 Senator	 Cory	 Booker	
attempts	 to	 create	 such	 a	 system.152	 	While	 still	 using	 the	 courts,	 the	
Second	 Look	 Act	 would	 allow	 courts	 to	 grant	 release	 and	 reduce	
sentences	should	an	inmate	demonstrate	their	readiness	for	reentry	to	
society	and	that	they	do	not	pose	a	risk	to	the	public.153		The	Act,	in	effect,	









such	 a	 blanket	provision—or	 total	 retroactivity	 of	Booker—would	be	
practical.	 	 A	 judicial	 parole	 system	 may	 not	 be	 efficient	 without	
additional	resources.	





regime	and	current	sentencing	practices.	 	There	 is	 little	question	that	
there	are	tools	built	in	to	the	compassionate	release	system	that	would	
allow	courts	to	make	it	a	de	facto	parole	system,	such	as	merely	reducing	
sentences	 and	 imposing	 supervised	 release.157	 	Were	 the	 gateway	 to	
compassionate	 release	 thus	 swung	 wide	 open,	 courts	 could	 review	
every	pre-Booker	sentence,	balance	the	inmate’s	history	and	risk	with	












The	main	 issue	with	 instituting	 either	 a	 brand	 new	 second	 look	
scheme	 or	 allowing	 all	 pre-Booker	 inmates	 to	 seek	 compassionate	










Courts	are	 likely	 in	 the	best	position	 to	oversee	 second	chances,	




inmates	 are	 granted	 compassionate	 release,	 Congress	 must	 provide	
clear,	 easily	 administrable	 rules	 to	 the	 judiciary	 while	 balancing	 the	




assume	 a	 strong	 rebuttable	 presumption	 for	 extraordinary	 and	
compelling	reasons	to	anyone	whose	sentence	is	sufficiently	close	to	the	






Second,	 Congress	 could	 instruct	 courts	 to	 presume	 a	 strong	
rebuttable	presumption	against	extraordinary	and	compelling	reasons	
to	anyone	sufficiently	close	to	the	mandatory	maximum.		This	has	the	
potential	 to	 balance	 concerns	 about	 overstepping	 sentencing	 judge	
power	and	disrupting	basic	principles	underlying	the	appellate	system	








clear	 the	 judge’s	 discretion	 was	 not	 hindered	 by	 the	 old	 sentencing	
regime.		Lastly,	for	any	inmate	outside	of	these	discretionary	thresholds,	
courts	 could	 provide	 that	 a	 change	 in	 the	 sentencing	 regime	 is	 not	
determinative,	 prompting	 courts	 to	 consider	 a	 number	 of	 additional	
factors—e.g.,	good	works,	rehabilitation,	family	matters,	and	so	forth—
in	making	a	finding	of	extraordinary	and	compelling	reasons.	
In	 either	 case,	 the	 petitioner	 or	 the	 government	 would	 be	
empowered	to	rebut	the	presumption	based	on	a	number	of	factors	to	
allow	 for	 individualized	 assessments	 that	 comport	with	 fundamental	
notions	of	 fairness	or	 the	goals	of	 sentencing.	 	That	 is,	 the	rebuttable	
presumption	would	create	an	escape	hatch	in	cases	of	clear	unfairness,	








In	 any	 event,	 compassionate	 release	 may	 be	 a	 strong	 tool	 for	
remedying	 pre-Booker	 sentences,	 provided	 guidance	 is	 given	 by	
Congress	 and	 the	 Commission	 in	 contemplating	 the	 various	 interests	
that	must	be	balanced	in	its	application:	namely,	separation	of	powers,	
workability,	fairness,	and	efficiency.		Until	then,	courts	will	continue	to	
confront	 a	 variety	 of	 issues	 given	 the	 law’s	 inherently	 open-ended	
nature.	
	
